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Around Arendt’s Table: 
Bureaucracy and the Non-Permanent Members  
of the UN Security Council 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Guernica dominates a curved display wall outside the chamber of the United Nations Security 
Council on the second floor of the Conference Building at the New York headquarters. A 
tapestry copy of Picasso’s out-size painting, Guernica shares its portion of the corridor with the 
Council’s press stakeout area, playing witness to the high drama of high politics. Never was its 
presence more acutely felt than on 5th February 2003, when it was veiled in UN blue for a 
ministerial-level meeting to discuss the situation in Iraq.1 During that meeting Colin Powell 
presented a series of aerial photographs in support of his government’s case for war.2 This rare 
intrusion of the visual into the august Council chamber recalled an earlier occasion when the 
world held its breath: Adlai Stevenson’s production in October 1962 of photographs showing 
Soviet military installations in Cuba.3 From Nazi aggression, to the Cuban Missile Crisis, to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military might and great power politics of the Security Council 
courts public attention. 
 
The resulting perception crowds out more mundane images of the Council, its everyday work, 
and its less prominent non-permanent members. During its very first term on the Council (2017-
19), Kazakhstan set about reasserting the place of smaller powers on the Council. On 2nd January 
2018, the press stakeout area was stage to the inaugural flag-installation ceremony for incoming 
Council members. The event, which Kazakhstan hopes to become a “meaningful annual 
tradition”,4 was meant to valorise non-permanent members, and to insist on their equality with 
other Council members – including the five permanent ones; Britain, China, France, Russia, and 
the USA.  
 
In effect, however, the flag installation theatrics evoked what Sara Ahmed calls “non-
performative” performance – a way of busily failing to make progress by design, characteristic of 
institutional bureaucracy.5 The red-tape around the press stakeout area took on, in this respect, a 
very different signification than the police-cordon it otherwise recalls. Taped off within the 
stakeout area, the flag installation ceremony took as its focal point the stock arrangement of the 
15 flags of current Council members – usually a backdrop for press briefings. Each flag occupies 
                                                 
1 See discussion in Anne Orford, “The Destiny of International Law” 17(3) LJIL (2004) 441–476, 458-461 
2 UN Doc. S/PV.4701 (5 February 2003) 
3 UN Doc. S/PV.2025 (25 October 1962) 
4 Readers can watch the ceremony here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCipmdnkn-c . Comments of the 
permanent representative of Kazakhstan, who compered the ceremony, are also recorded in a letter to the Secretary 
General, UN Doc. S/2018/254. 
5 Sara Ahmed, On Being Included (Duke UP, 2012) 
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a holder lodged into one of two portable stands, and are arranged in alphabetical order. The 
permanent members are not distinguished. Rigorously equal, each flag even droops to precisely 
the same degree, there being no wind indoors to ruffle them: a triumph of protocol. At the hour 
of the ceremony, six ambassadors and one minister waited on gaffer-taped marks as each took 
turn to slot their national flag into one of the vacant spots in the portable pedestals. Eventually 
every flag was planted, the diplomats assembled for their photo-call, and the two white-gloved 
security officers turned on their heels and marched away. The event did not symbolise equality, 
so much as solemnise administrative procedure – a diplomatic changing-of-the-guard. 
 
Kazakhstan’s ceremony is a bureaucratic echo of Colin Powell’s theatre of war. The different 
registers of the performances - the emergency and exigency of Powell’s, the ritual and protocol 
of Kazakhstan’s – nevertheless both enact authority and status. The exceptionality of great 
powers is countered by smaller states with an assertion of sovereign equality. The centrality of 
status is reflected in non-permanent members’ strategies to gain influence in the Council. This is 
easy enough to see in wrangles over its composition, but perhaps less obvious when it comes to 
working methods reform. In fact, struggles over how the Council works have been framed in 
terms of the acquisition of new administrative roles, as non-permanent states have pressed for 
positions as chairs of subcommittees and penholders on agenda items.6 Administrative 
responsibility is no substitute for politics. While accepting that deliberative politics is unlikely in 
the Council, this article urges non-permanent members to embrace more disruptive working 
methods as an alternative pathway to influence.  
 
Instead of asserting their individual importance, non-permanent members should focus on 
making more durable changes to the Council and its operations – ones that last beyond their 
two-year terms. My analysis draws on the work of Hannah Arendt to argue in favour of the 
renewing power of diversity.7 On this view, non-permanence is not undesirable, it is the essence 
of incoming members’ transformative potential, and a label worth reclaiming. In affirming 
renewal, I do not suggest that the Council can or does achieve the deliberative mutuality of 
Arendtian political action. Instead, my focus is on her distinction between labour and work. I 
argue that laborious administrative roles yield little durable product, and do not affirm plurality, 
because administrators are anonymous and interchangeable.8  Administrative reform reinforces 
the idea that incoming members are well-behaved guests in the permanent members’ house. A 
                                                 
6 In November 2018, the 10 incumbent and the five incoming non-permanent members wrote to the Council 
pressing for a more equal distribution of responsibilities. Their representative function was one of the arguments 
they gave in their favour. UN Doc. S/2018/1024 (15 November 2018) 
7 Arendt’s work has been used often and in diverse ways by international lawyers. See for example, Jan Klabbers, 
“Possible Islands of Predictability: The Legal Thought of Hannah Arendt” 20(1) LJIL (2007) 1–23; Susan Marks, 
“Law and the Production of Superfluity” 2(1) Transnational Legal Theory (2011) 1-24; Alison Kesby, The Right to 
Have Rights (OUP, 2012); Deborah Whitehall, “People in glass houses: lessons for international law from 
Margarethe von Trotta’s Hannah Arendt” 2(2) LRIL (2014) 329–353; Ioannis Kalpouzos and Itamar Mann, “Banal 
Crimes against Humanity: The Case of Asylum Seekers in Greece” 16(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 
(2015) 1-36; Ayça Cubukçu, “On the Exception of Hannah Arendt” 15(3) Law, Culture and the Humanities (2019) 
684–704 
8 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Harvest, 1969), 81 
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more hands-on and less business-as-usual approach could make non-permanent membership a 
force for renewal and transformation.   
 
The first part of the article reconsiders the implications of non-permanence in Security Council 
membership – the good, and the bad. The second part draws on Arendt’s insights to analyse 
working methods reform as a pathway to influence and renewal. The article ends by reflecting on 
the transformative potential of spontaneity and being in-the-way. 
 
2.  Implications of Impermanence 
 
Impermanence is usually treated as a barrier to influence, which can be removed either by 
seeking constitutional parity with the permanent members, or by achieving an operational 
redistribution of responsibilities. This contribution thinks through the second of these strategies 
for influence, using ideas Hannah Arendt elaborated in The Human Condition to do so. In this 
respect it follows Jan Klabbers in drawing on Arendt as a “source of inspiration” rather than a 
“fount of wisdom”.9 In particular, it does not find in Arendt’s work a blueprint for political 
action or deliberative democracy in the Security Council. 
 
Arendt shows us that while impermanence seems like a barrier to individual influence, it could 
be the key to transforming the Security Council. Although the Council will never be a space of 
appearance for a global polis, “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me”,10 it is 
nevertheless ripe for change. Premised on inequality, and deliberately designed as an elite body 
of strong-man states poised to take decisive action against aggressors, it was not made for mutual 
recognition and deliberative politics.11 But today its strongman credentials are at odds with the 
world. The Council is a microcosm of a world that no longer exists – one in which Britain and 
France were Great Powers, Germany and Japan were enemies of peace, and European colonisers 
still ruled much of the world. The sovereign inequality of the Council, with five Allied Powers as 
its permanent members and ten rotating non-permanent seats, is increasingly difficult to defend 
on grounds of functional proficiency. Rather than a positive vision of deliberative politics, then, 
this article proffers a negative one - the end of great power politics. 
 
Back in 2005 heads of state and government pledged “early reform of the Security Council… in 
order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further 
enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions”, but its 
composition is yet to change.12 Working methods reform emerged in 2006 as a more feasible 
alternative to composition reform. At present, however, it is hamstrung by being rendered in 
                                                 
9 Jan Klabbers, “Hannah Arendt and the Languages of Global Governance” in Marco Goldoni and Chris 
McCorkindale, Arendt and the Law (Hart, 2012), 229 
10 Arendt, The Human Condition, 198-199 
11 Isobel Roele, “The Vicious Circles of Habermas’ Cosmopolitics” 25(3) Law and Critique (2014) 119-229. cf. Ian 
Johnstone, “Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument” 14(3) EJIL (2003) 437; Ian 
Johnstone, “Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit” 102 
AJIL (2008) 275 
12 UN World Summit Outcome Document, UN Doc. A/Res/60/1 (2005), para. 153 
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terms of status. In November 2018, non-permanent members wrote to the Council president 
demanding greater parity of status through the redistribution of penholderships and 
chairpersonships.13 This framing has lumbered non-permanent members with much more 
responsibility and little more control. Arendt helps rethink non-permanent membership in terms 
of activity, rather than status. Instead of seeing responsibilities as badges that can be won, we 
focus on how non-permanent members might change the Council. Such change, moreover, 
depends not on becoming more like the permanent members through training programmes that 
enable new members to “hit the ground running”, but by new members insisting on each their 
particularity.   
 
a) Impermanence and renewal 
 
The UN Security Council is a “political organ” par excellence.14 Its particular brand of politics is 
identified with out-and-out Realpolitk, distinguishing it from the comparatively deliberative 
General Assembly. On this view, power is political capital – military, diplomatic, or moral – that 
one either possesses or lacks. Arendt offers an alternative view that associates politics with 
freedom rather than control. Here power is a matter of potential rather than possession. It 
inheres in the human capacity to act, and more precisely to begin something new. Moreover, for 
Arendt, politics is participatory and collective – it is about “being together”. The Council is not 
political in this sense. It is a space dominated by the P5, whose institutional privilege and political 
capital alienate the ten rotating non-permanent members from the organ. 
 
The UN Charter famously privileges the five permanent members of the Council - Britain, 
China, France, Russia, and the USA – with a veto power over decisions.15 These states also enjoy 
considerable privileges that stem from the fact of their permanence. Michael Reisman vividly 
likened the Council to a matryoshka doll, which contains “ever-smaller ‘mini-Councils’, each 
meeting behind closed doors without keeping records, and each taking decisions secretly”.16 The 
P5, P3 and P1 dominate the body, marginalising the ten non-permanent members, and the 
broader the UN membership as a whole.17 This mode of politics is action-oriented, not 
discursive – geared to providing “prompt and effective action”.18 Council politics are also seen as 
very self-interested,19 rendering politics a matter of “people [being] only for or against other 
people”.20 
 
                                                 
13 UN Doc. S/2018/1024 (15 November 2018) 
14 As Judge Schwebel said, “the Security Council is a political organ which acts for political reasons” rather than legal 
ones. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA) Merits, ICJ Reports, 1986, 
dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, 290, para. 60 
15 UN Charter, Article 27(3) 
16 W. Michael Reisman, “The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations” 87(1) AJIL (1993) 83-100, 85. Cf.  
17 Mahubani, “The Permanent and Elected Council Members”, 256-257 
18 UN Charter, Article 24(1) 
19 Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum, Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council Since 1945 
(Routledge, 2008) 
20 Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7 
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Domination and self-interest are not the Council’s only faults: it is also thoroughly 
bureaucratised. Bureaucracy is entirely in keeping with the UN’s modus operandi,21 and has crept in 
both as a means of curtailing the permanent members’ power (for instance in the requirement 
that the Council report on its work,22 and consult more widely23), and as a means for the body to 
exercise power (the proliferation of subsidiary organs,24 and the use of monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms testify to this25). Contrary to its popular image, the Council is not always in 
emergency mode. An increasing proportion of its business concerns mandate renewals, expert 
reports, horizon-scanning, and liaising with other global actors.26 For Arendt, bureaucracy is 
violent, too. Famously describing it as “rule by nobody”, she pointed out that it makes everyone 
equally powerless without the need for a tyrant. Bureaucracy is indifferent to human beings and 
denies us our “faculty of action”, which rests, she says, on the ability “to embark on something 
new”.27 Bureaucracy is “anti-politics” in Arendt’s work, to use Klabbers’s apt term.28 
 
Arendt primarily talked about the stifling effect of bureaucracy on political action in terms of 
responsibility, because it alienates men from their actions. Bureaucracy is also stifling because it 
demands more of the same. It generates an ocean of certainty, to adapt Arendt’s famous image. 
Here, rule is “misused to cover the whole ground of the future and to map out a path secured in 
all directions”.29 In this respect, bureaucracy is inimical to freedom conceived of as “the 
spontaneous beginning of something new”.30 This is precisely what has happened to the non-
permanent members of the Security Council. The yearly intake of five new members brings with 
it a promise of renewal, which is systematically neutralized by channeling the activity of new 
members into bureaucratic avenues, and by socializing them into established administrative 
patterns. 
 
Every January, five new members enter the Security Council, and five old ones leave. Although 
we talk about the Council in terms of its permanent and non-permanent members, in practice 
there are several groups: Permanent members, sophomore non-permanents, freshman non-
permanents, recent graduates, incoming members elect, and candidates for future membership. 
                                                 
21 As Anne Orford shows in International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP, 2011) 94-97. See also, my 
Articulated Security: The United Nations and its Infra-Law (CUP, forthcoming). 
22 UN Charter, Article 24(3) 
23 The “Green Book”, of Working Methods Handbook contains multiple entries relating to consultations and 
dialogues. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/  
24 UN Charter, Article 29 
25 See e.g. Isobel Roele, “Disciplinary Power in the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee” 19(1) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (2014) 49-84 
26 A sense of the vast body of rolling business can be gained by reading the monthly digest of the Security Council 
Reporting and Mandate Cycles, prepared by the Security Council Secretariat Branch of the Department of Political 
and Peacebuilding Affairs. The 2019 edition, published in December 2018, runs to 113 pages. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/general/reportingandmandatecycles_1
22018.pdf   
27 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Harvest, 1969), 81-82 
28 Jan Klabbers, “Possible Islands of Predictability: The Legal Thought of Hannah Arendt” 20(1) LJIL (2007) 1–23, 
11 
29 Arendt, The Human Condition, 244 
30 Arendt, The Human Condition, 234 
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The dynamism of Council composition involves a sizeable portion of the wider UN 
membership, which at least gestures towards inclusivity. In this sense, the short two-year term 
served by non-permanent members is a potential source of renewal for the Council.31 It suggests 
a glimmer of natality, “the new beginning inherent in birth” which makes action, and therefore 
politics, possible.32  
 
Newness and difference are connected for Arendt. Pluralistic politics depends on the renewing 
effect of birth and the potential for spontaneity it brings. For her, political action “corresponds 
to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit 
the world”.33 What does Arendt understand by plurality? It means “the presence and acting of 
others”: being together.34 This connotes gathering in a place, not abstract collectivity. Here, 
difference does not exclude identity because actors inhabit a shared world. Diverse individuals 
“can retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity, by being related to the same chair and the 
same table”.35 The Council’s political authority resides in the gathering of its members around its 
famous horseshoe table, not in blitzkrieg reactions or unanimous votes. Regular renewals of the 
Council membership make it possible to bring new configurations of states around the Council 
table – ones with particular experience in regional, thematic and situational issues on the 
Council’s agenda. Arendt offers a new way to think of plurality, in terms different from 
geographical representation and security savoir-faire, the terms on which Council elections are 
usually conducted.36  
 
In Arendt’s work, plurality is the condition of public sphere, the existence of which is 
controversial on a global scale – even within the internationalist walls of the UN. The UN is a 
space of alienation, where state actors lack the common sense of a shared outside world, and 
meet one another in a state of splendid sovereign isolation. Political action in Arendt’s sense is 
not the only way that the UN might be something more than war-by-other-means, a space for 
states to duke out their differences by exchange of letters. There is a gap between deliberative 
politics and Great Power rule that can be filled negatively by refusing what is there, rather than 
offering something new. This politics of difference also rests on the spontaneous newness that 
non-permanent membership brings – for the disruptive effects of renewal. This brings an 
Adornian edge to Arendt in the form of non-identity thinking.37 
 
The obvious objection to this valorization of polyvocality and spontaneous objection is that 
security is all about order and decision. Disruptive activity may slow the pace of reaction in 
emergency situations, and would render unanimity elusive. The Council’s univocal and 
                                                 
31 UN Charter, Article 23(2) 
32 Arendt, The Human Condition, 9 
33 Arendt, The Human Condition, 7 
34 Arendt, The Human Condition, 237 
35 Arendt, The Human Condition, 209 
35 Arendt, The Human Condition, 67 
36 UN Charter, Article 23(1) 
37 Theodor Adorno’s negative dialectics changed the direction of conceptuality, “to give it a turn toward non-
identity”, Negative Dialectics (trans. E. B. Ashton) (Continuum, 1973), 12 
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unequivocal decisions may show Schmittian resolve,38 but it is an unsavoury model of authority. 
Arendt recognized that action leads to unpredictability, but concluded that, 
 
“It is the obvious short-range advantages of tyranny, the advantages of stability, security, 
and productivity, that one should beware, if only because they pave the way to an 
inevitable loss of power”.39 
 
For Arendt, politics – the action of being together, and talking about how we might be together 
in the future – is a matter of tempering renewal with predictability, without letting the latter 
devolve into tyranny. Given its composition, mandate and the lack of constitutional limits to its 
power, the Council seems poised on the brink of tyranny, or in the more current phrase 
hegemony.40 Even in more positive narratives, the Council is seen as a bastion of strong 
leadership in an unstable world, and we might see the Charter as mandating a cadre of big men 
phalanxed by yes-men. 
 
Still, as non-traditional security challenges like pandemic disease, transnational organised crime 
and climate change have begun to populate the Council’s agenda, and as the human security 
discourse has taken hold in the UN, it is increasingly difficult to affirm a view of the Council-as-
strongman. As Marrti Koskenniemi famously imagined, such a comprehensive conception of 
security lets the police into the temple.41 The image contains the wrong kinds of both certainty 
and unpredictability: the certainty of domination and the unpredictability of how it lashes out. 
The tension between the five permanent members – especially between the three Western states 
on one side, and Russia and China on the other – are the most commonly cited brake on this 
ugly concatenation. Great power, on this view, can only be countered by great power. This 
discourse is echoed by the G4 group of states who support one another’s permanent 
membership of the Council. Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan.42 All four states premise their 
case for permanent inclusion on their economic, institutional and regional clout. They seek to 
renew the Council, in other words, by imitating the exceptional status of the present incumbents. 
 
b) Impermanence as a barrier to influence  
 
As well as suggesting a positive side to impermanence, Arendt’s work also helps dig down into 
the more familiar downsides. This sub-section uses her distinction between work and labour to 
                                                 
38 Anna Hood, “The United Nations Security Council’s Legislative Phase and the Rise of Emergency International 
Law-Making” in Kim Rubenstein and Hitoshi Nasu, Legal Perspectives on Security Institutions (CUP, 2015)  
39 Arendt, The Human Condition, 222 
40 For criticisms of the Council on similar grounds, see: Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: 
Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order” 16(3) EJIL (2005) 369-408; José Alvarez, 
“Hegemonic International Law Revisited” 97(4) AJIL (2003) 873-888 
41 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN; A Dialectical View” 6(3) EJIL (1995) 
325-348 
42 A draft General Assembly resolution for Security Council reform was sponsored by all four states, among others. 
UN Doc. A/59/L.64 (2005) 
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recast some of the challenges faced by Council members. I identify three: the brevity of their 
terms; their relative institutional knowledge; and their lack of belonging. 
 
The first barrier to influence is the brevity of membership. Making a durable difference in the 
Council, one that outlasts a member’s term, is difficult to do in the space of two years – 
especially given that the Charter does not allow consecutive terms.43 New members arrive in 
medias res, faced with a pre-existing agenda and programme of work. Moreover, few situations on 
the Council’s agenda can be squared away within two years – even if an incoming member is up-
to-speed from day one. Non-permanent members rarely get to see an issue through to 
completion, and usually inherit someone else’s strategy for dealing with it. 
 
As part of their reform agenda, the Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural 
Questions have sought to ensure that incoming members can make the most of their terms. One 
initiative has been to bring forward elections from October to June, so that members elect have 
six months to prepare, rather than just two.44 Another innovation has been to give incoming 
states privileges, including observing Council meetings (subject to the objection of incumbent 
members).45 The longer lead-in time gives new members the chance to undertake training and to 
familiarise themselves with Council procedures, and the formidable number of items on its 
agenda. In effect, the brief terms non-permanent member states serve are a mad dash.46 The 
frenetic speed of Council activity is not only a product of the Charter imperative for “prompt” 
action, or a result of the time-poverty characteristic of highly bureaucratised environments. It is 
also a matter of mood. Training and socialisation processes reinforce the feeling. An orientation 
workshop for new members run by Finland is called “hitting the ground running”, and there is 
immense pressure on new members to keep up, fit in and fall into step with the pace set by the 
permanent members. 
 
States have sought ways of counteracting the brevity of their terms. Some make it their business 
to sit on the Council as much as possible. Japan, for instance, has served 11 terms. It is among a 
number of states which have found ways to keep-its-hand-in, even when off the Council. Japan 
has been particularly active, in this regard, in pressing forward with working methods reform. 
Other states, including Finland, Sweden and Turkey, also involve themselves with the Council 
even when they are not member states. Finland provides the orientation training session; and 
Turkey and Sweden, for instance, have hosted annual retreats for the Security Council.47 If states 
want to have lasting effects, new members must have “the tactical dexterity to play with the P5”, 
as John Langmore and Jeremy Farrall put it in their analysis of Australia’s 2013-14 term on the 
                                                 
43 UN Charter, Article 23(2) 
44 UN Doc. S/2016/619 (15 July 2016) 
45 UN Doc. S/2017/507, paras 140-142 
46 Below, at 3(b) 
47 Turkey in cooperation with the International Peace Institute. Sweden held the retreat in April 2018 in Dag 
Hammarskjold’s private estate. See: https://www.government.se/articles/2018/04/note-to-the-press-on-the-
secretary-generals-security-council-retreat-in-backakra-sweden/  
January 2019 Arendt’s Table Isobel Roele 
 
 
 
9 
Council.48 Australia’s ability to deploy such dexterity has enabled it to effect Council business 
even when it is not serving on the body, especially in its work as part of the Contact Group on 
Timor Leste.49 
 
Still, being involved on the fringes does not guarantee these states a say in core Council business. 
The Council operates a conveyer-belt system, as incoming members replace outgoing ones with 
little regard to the particularity of either.50 The important thing is that a state is competent, 
regardless of any idiosyncratic insights it might offer. When it comes to administration, the 
Council is as much of a meritocracy as the nineteenth century bureaucracies described by Max 
Weber, and new states are funnelled into training sessions which enable them to seamlessly take 
the reins from outgoing colleagues. The interchangeability of administrative roles, we might say  
is an instance of rule by anybody, if not quite “rule by nobody” as Arendt described totalitarian 
bureaucracy.  
 
A second issue for non-permanent members is that, compared to the permanent members, they 
have less institutional knowledge; both in terms of day-to-day savoir faire and in terms of long-
term memory. Kishore Mahubani affirmed this, quoting the permanent representative of 
Cameroon: “The presence of permanent members in an institution is in itself a decisive 
advantage”.51 However, as we shall see, the extent to which this is the case differs greatly 
depending on the delegation. There is a world of difference between non-permanent members 
of the Council in terms of their delegation size, political clout, economic heft, local knowledge, 
and institutional memory. It would be misguided to assume that increased non-permanent 
involvement tout court makes the Council more diverse and pluralistic, as many of the most active 
non-permanent members belong to the Western Europe and Others Group in the UN.52 
 
For some elected members serving on the Council is a daunting prospect.53 However, it is a 
much less daunting when one works in a well-staffed mission.  The US mission is the largest. 
The UK’s mission is half the size: the UN Blue Book lists around 45 ambassadors, counsellors, 
secretaries and attachés.54 Norway, running for election in 2020-21, lists an 18-strong team, 
slightly fewer than Khazakstan (20). These lists do not, of course, tell the whole story. However, 
the individuals seconded to the UN to bolster a mission for the duration of a state’s Council 
membership lack the deep institutional knowledge of their colleagues who work in the institution 
                                                 
48 John Langmore and Jeremy Farrall, “Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN Security Council? 
Australia’s Experience in 2013–2014” 22 Global Governance (2016), 59–77, 68 
49 Jeremy Farrall and Jochen Prantl, “Leveraging diplomatic power and influence on the UN Security Council: the 
case of Australia” 70(6) Australian Journal of International Affairs (2016) 601-612. For more on Groups of Friends and 
Contact Groups, see below at, s. 3(b) 
50 The November 2018 letter from the non-permanent members urges the Council to recognise and make use of 
their regional and thematic experience and expertise. UN Doc. S/2018/1024 (15 November 2018)   
51 Mahubani, “The Permanent and Elected Council Members”, 253 (quoting UN Doc. S/PV.4677 (20 December 
2002)) 
52 These are formal regional groupings in the UN system, and are listed on the UN’s Department for General 
Assembly and Conference Management. Available at: https://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml  
53 Sievers and Daws, SC Procedure, 130. The transition into the Council is “brutal”. 
54 Available at: https://protocol.un.org/dgacm/pls/site.nsf/BlueBook.xsp  
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full-time. The institutional savoir faire and personal contacts of mission staff – particularly the all-
important political coordinator – can determine the success of a term. Not only the size, but also 
the experience and training of a mission, then, affect a state’s ability to adjust to the breakneck 
high politics of the Council.55 
 
The ease with which an incoming member navigates the Council also depends on the number of 
terms it has served. Germany and Belgium (both part of the 2019 intake), have already served 5 
terms. By contrast, of the Council members at the time of writing, Kazakhstan (2017-18) and 
Equatorial Guinea (2018-19) have no prior experience, and neither does newly elected 
Dominican Republic (2019-20). Frequent fliers have a rich institutional memory especially when 
they make a study of the Council. This is literally the case for Japan, which in 2006 produced a 
working methods manual for the Council, now known as The Green Book.56 
 
Steps have been taken to remedy deficits in institutional knowledge. Member states receive 
training sessions from various providers,57 and the Security Council Affairs Division of the 
Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs also provides support. Amongst other things, the 
Division has responsibility for the Council’s Repertoire of Practice. States, however, have been 
unimpressed with this offering, and the Division has been criticised in the UN’s internal review 
processes for the lack of support it provides to new members.58 The Repertoire has taken a lot of 
flak from states, which have asked instead for more information about the Council’s rules and 
procedures.59 
 
The third barrier to influence is more inchoate, and relates to another way in which new 
members may be daunted: lack of a sense of belonging. In more than one way, the permanent 
members own the Security Council: it is their house, which others visit at their pleasure. The 
Dumbarton Oaks powers claim credit for creating the UN in the first place, and the Charter 
gives them privileges as permanent members. They not only know-the-ropes, they designed the 
ropes. Furthermore, the UN is situated in New York, and held its first meeting in London. 
Although it has met elsewhere – including Addis Ababa, Geneva, Nairobi, Panama City and 
Paris, and although its delegates sometimes undertake fieldtrips,60  its centre of gravity is firmly 
planted in the global North.  
 
                                                 
55 “Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council” 59(3) International Organization (2005) 559-592, 569-
70 
56 The Handbook is periodically updated, and advertised on the Council website. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/introduction  
57 Discussed in brief below, at 3(b) 
58 OIOS, Audit Report: The Security Council Affairs Division in DPA (October 2010), Assignment No. AP2010/560/01. 
Available at: https://usun.state.gov/sites/default/files/organization_pdf/159757.pdf  
59 UN Doc. E/AC.51/2007/2/Add.2, para. 15 and E/AC.51/2007/2/Add.2, para. 12 
60 Its first fieldtrip to Cambodia and Viet Nam was in the summer of 1964, though in recent years visits have proved 
more difficult to organise, according to Security Council Report, “Security Council Visiting Missions” (14 May 
2018). Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/visiting-
mission.php  
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The control exerted by the permanent members over the Council is much remarked.61 As 
Mahubani put it “while the P-5 have been given power without responsibility; the E-10 have 
been given responsibility without power”.62 The sense that the Council is a sort of autonomous 
region within the UN plays out in frequent antagonisms between the Council and the Assembly 
on the one hand, and the Council and the Secretariat on the other.63 If joining the Council is 
treated as temporary membership of an elite club, to enter its doors is to enter a rarefied world-
within-a-world. The relatively recent practice of holding monthly meetings for the ambassadors 
and for political coordinators of non-permanent members is a sensible corrective for the 
daunting prospect faced by new missions, but it does not necessarily tackle the alienation of the 
elected members.64 Instead, it tends to reinforce Reisman’s Matryoshka doll image by producing 
another closed circle within the Council. 
 
Of course, not all delegations experience this alienation in the same way. Some 60 states are 
absolute strangers to the Council, having never taken a seat around its table.65 This is often a 
question of size (Micronesia, Liechtenstein) or money (Kiribati, Lao and Lesotho are all currently 
on the UN’s list of Least Developed Counties),66 and may have as much to do with a state’s 
ability to field a sufficiently robust mission, as its formal contribution to international peace and 
security. That said, the number of never-members continues, hearteningly, to decline. At the 
time of writing, the Council has welcomed several first-timers, including the Dominican 
Republic and Kazakhstan. For other states – particularly those active in the Non-Aligned 
Movement – maintaining a certain distance from the Council, as currently composed, is a badge 
of pride. Among the states which seek permanent seats of a reformed and expanded Security 
Council, India and Brazil – both Non-Aligned Movement stalwarts – have distanced themselves 
from the powers-that-be in the Council. During India’s seven terms and Brazil’s 10, both states 
have often been outspoken in their doubts about the Council’s activities, a critical distance they 
maintain by speaking out at meetings even when they are not serving on the body.67 
 
Indeed, the Council affords various opportunities for states outside its orbit to involve 
themselves in its work. Troop and police contributing countries, for example, are accorded 
privileges of consultation not available to the general membership.68 Moreover, any state can, 
                                                 
61 Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International 
Legal Order” 16(3) EJIL (2005) 369-408; José Alvarez, “Hegemonic International Law Revisited” 97(4) AJIL (2003) 
873-888, 
62 Kishore Mahubani, “The Permanent and Elected Council Members” in D.M Malone (ed.) The UN Security Council 
(Lynne Rienner, 2004), 256 
63 Under Kofi Annan the relationship between the permanent members and the Secretariat could be frosty. Annan 
strongly supported the body’s reform. Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (Penguin, 2012), Ch. IV 
64 “Ten Elements for Enhanced E10 Coordination and Joint Action”, September 2018. Sievers and Daws, SC 
Procedure: Online Update to Ch. 3, s. 3 (10 December 2018). Available at: https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-3-
section-3i  
65 The UN publishes a list. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/notelected.asp  
66 https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldcs-at-a-glance.html  
67 UN Charter, Article 32; Security Council Provisional Rules of Procedure, Rules 37 and 38 (UN Doc. S/96/Rev.7 
(1982)) 
68 UN Doc. S/2017/507  
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subject to members’ consent, observe Council meetings, even informal Arria meetings – though 
most Council business takes place in the private informal-consultations-of-the-whole, behind 
closed doors. Interested states can, in theory, follow the Council’s programme of work and 
agenda through the UN Journal and various other publications undertaken in the name of 
transparency. In practice, the Council’s breakneck speed outpaces this mode of engagement. In 
any case, efforts to improve transparency do not address the fundamental feeling that those 
without a permanent place in the Council are outsiders looking on.69 
 
Some states have attempted to increase their influence in more creative ways. This article opened 
with Kazakhstan’s attempt to institute a flag installation ceremony - as instant tradition-making. 
Other states have been equally ingenious in finding ways of leaving a mark on the body. Three 
states – Germany, Norway and Russia – have asserted their ownership over the Council in a 
material way.70 From approximately 2008 until 2015 the UN campus at Turtle Bay was renovated 
as part of the Capital Master Plan – including the Council’s three dedicated rooms: its Chamber, 
its Consultations Room, and its Quiet Room. This involved both practical improvements, such 
as updating the air-conditioning and wifi, and refurbishing the translators’ booths, and aesthetic 
choices. Germany’s contribution to the Quiet Room, for instance, included Walter Knoll 
furniture, a tasteful colour scheme, and a mural of a Teutonic forest.  
 
Norway made no aesthetic changes to the Council Chamber, which it designed and created in 
1952, at the behest of Secretary General Trygve Lie.71 As Ban Ki-moon put it at the inauguration 
of the room, “if… Trygve Lie … were with us today, I am sure he would feel quite at home ... 
Perhaps the only thing he would miss would be the ash trays!”.72 The Chamber was originally 
designed by architect Arnstein Arneberg to reflect, as Norway’s Crown Prince recognised when 
he announced Norway’s candidacy for a seat on the Council for the 2021-22 biennium, 
“Norwegian craftsmanship and values”.73 Per Krohg’s painting, Else Poulsson’s wallpaper and 
curtains, and the blue delegates’ chairs designed by Finn Nilsson and made by cabinetmaker 
Johan Fr. Monrad constitute the material world of the Council chamber. At the first meeting of 
the Council in its permanent home on 4th April 1952, the President thanked “all those, both high 
and humble, who have by their joint effort built for us a beautiful place in which to serve and 
                                                 
69 There is an increasing body of writing questioning the value of transparency. Haridimos Tsoukas, “The Tyranny 
of Light” 29(9) Futures (1997) 827-843; Marilyn Strathern, “The Tyranny of Transparency” 26(3) British Educational 
Research Journal (2000) 309-321;  Andrea Bianchi, Anne Peters (eds), Transparency in International Law (CUP, 2013); 
Fleur Johns, “The Deluge” 1(1) LRIL (2013) 9-34 
70 The materiality of international law is explored in Jessie Hohmann and Daniel Joyce, International Law’s Objects 
(OUP, 2018 – forthcoming) 
71 Ingeborg Glambek, “The Council Chambers in the UN Building in New York” 15 Scandinavian Journal of Design 
History (2005) 8-39 
72 Ban Ki Moon, “Remarks at the inauguration of the renovated Security Council Chamber” (16 April 2013). 
Available at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2013-04-16/remarks-inauguration-renovated-
security-council-chamber  
73 Speech given by His Royal Highness The Crown Prince at the launch of Norway's candidacy for a seat on the 
United Nations Security Council 2021–22, New York 22 June 2018. Available at: 
https://www.kongehuset.no/tale.html?tid=163838&sek=26947&scope=27248  
January 2019 Arendt’s Table Isobel Roele 
 
 
 
13 
work for the highest interests of peace and security in the world”.74 Norway’s durable 
contribution is not be replicable by other states, but it illustrates the role non-permanent 
members can have in making the Council’s world – rather than only inhabiting it. 
 
Norway is intensely proud of the Council Chamber, and subverts its non-permanent status by 
playing on the permanence of its creation. The website of its permanent mission to the UN, for 
instance, boasts an article about the Chamber entitled “Norway’s permanent Security Council 
place”,75 and one of its Flickr albums dedicated to the Council carries the description “Norway 
doesn’t have a permanent seat in the UN’s Security Council. The Security Council Chamber’s 
chairs … however, are all Norwegian”.76 Its contribution to the material form of the Council 
gives Norway a sense of ownership, if not belonging, in the organ. Its diplomats may not always 
have a voice in the Council, but its craftsmen ensure that Norway keeps its hand in. 
 
How does Arendt help us understand these three barriers to influence – brevity of term, lack of 
institutional knowledge, and sense of belonging – differently? Key to the answer is her 
distinction between work and labour.77 These two activities are prior to political speech and 
action, which we met in the previous section. Work and labour are differentiated by their 
durability and futility, respectively. Labour is needed to sustain life: its products are no sooner 
made than consumed. Work, by contrast, makes the shared human world we inhabit – works 
outlive their creators.78 By engendering “the worldly stability of the human artifice”, work makes 
politics possible.79 It creates a physical place for human being-together, which could become the 
conceptual space of the polis if it is one where human beings can “distinguish themselves instead 
of being merely distinct”.80  
 
The three barriers to influence appear in a different light if we think of them in terms of work. 
The non-permanent members cannot leave themselves behind in the Council, but they can leave 
an enduring mark. Arendt’s distinction casts Norway’s perhaps superficial-seeming contribution 
in a new light. The men and women who made the objects in the Chamber – including the 
famous horseshoe table – created a shared space is indispensable to politics. Arendt recognized 
the tendency to downplay such contributions. The modern world, she wrote, regards “everything 
beyond the enforcement of law and order as "idle talk" and "vain-glory"”.81 On the contrary, the 
importance of sitting around the same table in the same chairs should not be underestimated. 
She explained, 
 
                                                 
74 UN Doc. S/PV.575 (4 April 1952), 2 
75 Available at: https://www.norway.no/en/missions/un/norway-and-the-un/norways-rich-history-at-the-
un/norways-permanent--place-in-the-security-council/  
76 Available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/norwayun/sets/72157631290329704  
77 The distinction has been criticised, especially by Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2003),  esp. 130-133 
78 Arendt, The Human Condition, 136-139 
79 Arendt, The Human Condition, 126 
80 Arendt, The Human Condition, 209 
80 Arendt, The Human Condition, 67 
81 Arendt, The Human Condition, 159 
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“To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those 
who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, 
like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time”.82 
 
Non-permanent member strategies to increase their influence should aim to produce durable 
contributions, not just shoulder responsibilities. Focus is often on outcome documents. The 
Council’s main work product is not world peace, but outcome documents.83 Although 
characteristic of a “bygone technocratic universalism”, outcome documents and the meetings 
which produce them are the centrepiece of non-permanent members’ efforts to increase their 
influence in the Council. Although bureaucracy is a technology in which we have lost faith,84 as 
Riles explains, it is nevertheless “one that we already know how to use”.85 Non-permanent 
members cannot, however, use the tools of bureaucracy to break into the world of high politics. 
Bureaucracy is not a condition of political action in Arendt’s sense. On the contrary, it is 
deadening. It results in the zombified “non-performative” performance identified by Ahmed, 
whereby going through the administrative motions substitutes for real change.86  
 
Arendt’s distinction between labour and work offers a critical tool for reassessing some of the 
strategies states have undertaken to increase non-permanent members’ influence. Many of these 
efforts have been aimed at making the state itself a permanent fixture in the Council. Arendt’s 
association of political action and renewal cast doubt on the enlivening effects such composition 
reform could attain. When seen through an Arendtian lens, a large tranche of other efforts - 
those which focus on the distribution of work and the training of new members – are more 
reminiscent of futile labour than durable work. It is to this second group of reform efforts – 
working methods reform – that I now turn. 
 
3. Critique of Working Methods Reform 
 
Great efforts have been made to improve the lot of non-permanent members under the rubric 
of working methods.87 The initiative was initially taken by a permanent member – France. It 
produced an aide mémoire, a form designed to transmit established practices, rather than modify 
them.88 Since 2006 the question of working methods reform has been taken on non-permanent 
members, who have leveraged working methods reform to pave a pathway to influence. 
Initiatives by the “small five” (Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland) and 
Japan to reform of the Council’s (still) Provisional Rules of Procedure,89 metamorphosed into 
                                                 
82 Arendt, The Human Condition, 52 
83 Below, at 3(b) 
84 See generally David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules (Melville House, 2015) 
85 Annelise Riles, “Outputs: the promises and perils of ethnographic engagement after the loss of faith in 
transnational dialogue” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (2017) 183-198, 187 
86 The context of Ahmed’s discussion is university commitments to diversity, see especially Ch. 4 
87 See generally, Joanna Harrington, “The Working Methods of the UN Security Council: Maintaining the 
Implementation of Change” 66(1) ICLQ (2017) 39-77 
88 UN Doc. S/1994/1279 
89 The Non-Aligned Movement has long pressed for the rules of procedure to be formalised.  
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efforts to reform the Council’s working methods at operational level. On its face, working 
methods reform is a potentially much more progressive and inclusive strategy for making other 
voices heard in the Council, as it focuses on transforming the way the Council works, rather than 
elevating the status of specific states to match the P5. In practice, however, the strategy has 
failed because administrative roles have been taken as indicators of importance, but are 
extremely difficult to leverage in order to leave lasting effects on the Council. This is because, as 
Arendt’s insights reveal, administrative activity is labour rather than work. 
 
The institutional vehicle for working methods reform are Notes of the President, which are 
usually reserved for procedural matters like the appointment of subcommittee chairs and 
renewing the mandates of working groups. They are archetypal administrative instruments. As 
such, they escape the permanent members’ veto power.90 Notes are not binding, but they are 
outcome documents nonetheless, and therefore the product of negotiation between members. 
They are adopted by consensus, and are not invalidated in cases where a member dissociates 
itself.91 The chief working methods instrument is Note 507, which has been updated several 
times since its first iteration in 2006,92 and was the subject of a presidential statement in 2015, 
signalling a high level of commitment.93  
 
Note 507 describes itself as a ‘concise and user-friendly list of recent practices’. It has been 
through regular updates, and includes – amongst other things – the issues to which we now turn; 
chairing subsidiary bodies, and penholding. The next two sub-sections show how this sort of 
working methods reform is not best placed to overcome the barriers to influence discussed in 
the last section. The crux of the problem is that working methods deal with daily operational 
matters, which are often administrative and bureaucratic and, as Anne Orford has shown, offer 
those who undertake them little opportunity to engage in strategic decision-making.94 The 
languages of managerialism and bureaucracy permeate the UN,95 and working methods reform is 
a particularly fertile arena for their use. Indeed, the agenda is guided in the Security Council by 
echt managerial principles of “efficiency and transparency”.96  
 
The bureaucratic pathway for influence frames Council activities as labour rather than work, in 
Arendt’s terms. It brings with it a crescendo of administrative busywork, but scant chance for 
voicing alternative perspectives on acutely politicised matters. In their understandable drive to 
affect as wide a scope of Council activity as possible, non-permanent members sometimes risk 
                                                 
90 UN Charter, Article 27(3) 
91 Sievers and Daws, SC Procedure, 429 
92 UN Doc. S/2006/507 (19 July 2006 ); UN Doc. S/2010/507 (26 July 2010); UN Doc. S/2017/507 (30 August 
2017) 
93 S/PRST/2015/19 (30 October 2015). At the open debate on the matter earlier that month, 43 non-Council states 
requested to participate, suggesting that the issues discussed were seen as important to the UN membership more 
generally, UN Doc. S/PV.7539 (20 Oct 2015) 
94 Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP, 2011)  
95 Klaas Dykmann, Jenny M. Lewis and Sune Raahede Bentzen, “When Managerialism Meets Internationalism: 
Administrative Reform in the United Nations in the 1970s” 37(12) International Journal of Public Administration (2014) 
856-865 
96 UN Doc. S/2017/507, para. 1 
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converting activities which seem ripe for work – like the drafting of outcome documents – into 
administrative churn. Arendt, an implacable critic of the gigantic bureaucratic machines of mid-
twentieth-century states, equated bureaucracy with violence; bureaucracies leave no room for 
argument, excluding the political thereby.97  
 
a) Chairing Subsidiary Bodies  
 
Most of the Council’s business is done in its subsidiary bodies.98 At the time of writing, the 
Council had 14 sanctions committees and two committees designed to monitor and assist in the 
implementation of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism obligations.99 Among a handful of 
other standing committees, it also has 5 working groups, including one for working methods 
reform. The Council might be a UN political organ, but in practice it is as administrative a body 
as any in the UN. In this light, it is no surprise that increased administrative load is prized as 
evidence of increased institutional responsibility.  
 
The labouriousness of much Council activity – particularly the kind done by non-permanent 
members – is nowhere more obvious than in its sub-committees. Subcommittee chairs are 
sought-after positions within the Council, giving non-permanent members not only status and 
institutional territory, but also ownership over certain issues. In theory, chairing roles ensure 
non-permanent members are not mere bystanders to P5 action. Here, I argue that the activities 
performed correspond to a particular form of labour: housekeeping. Arendt wrote about “the 
rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices – from the shadowy 
interior of the household into the light of the public sphere” in the context of her concerns 
about “the rise of the social”.100  
 
Arendt is routinely taken to task for her symbolic gendering of the social realm “as a scaled-up 
form of household”. Recognising this, Patricia Owens nevertheless finds in her ideas a powerful 
critique of this scaled-up household: it is devastating for meaningful politics.101 For our purposes, 
Arendt’s association of housekeeping with bureaucracy helps to reveal the withering away of 
politics and its substitution for pure administration.102 She associates the social with labour, life 
processes, with the natural world - rather than the artificed world of work.103 Housekeeping and, 
by extension, its scaled-up version, bureaucracy, are futile activities in Arendt’s sense – their 
products are immediately consumed in the life process. This sort of labour is “an endless 
activity” that never produces a finished product.104   
 
                                                 
97 Arendt On Violence, 81-87 
98 UN Charter, Article 29 
99 Established under resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1373 (2001) respectively. 
100 Arendt, The Human Condition, 38 
101 Patricia Owens, “Not life but the world is at stake: Hannah Arendt on citizenship in the age of the social” 16(2) 
Citizenship Studies (2012) 297-307, 297 
102 Arendt, The Human Condition, 44 
103 Above, at 
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Arendt’s insights into the arduous quality of administrative work – its never-ending cycles and 
lack of durable product – throw doubt on the value of sub-committee chairs as a way for non-
permanent members to exert their influence. Note 507 looks like a hollow victory in this light.  
 
In January 2017 states gathered to draft a new, comprehensive iteration of Note 507.105 Several 
speakers mentioned what India’s representative evocatively called “the subterranean universe of 
the Council’s subsidiary bodies”.106 Still, control of these back-room venues were seen by many 
as a pathway to influence for non-permanent members. Compared to the Presidency of the 
Council, which rotates every month, annually appointed chairs seem to provide opportunity to 
make a more sustained impact. A second reason for the hope reposed in sub-committees is that 
they take decisions by consensus, which means that the permanent members are defanged of 
their vetoes. In the world of non-permanent members, then, there has been much enthusiasm 
for redistribution of these tasks. Panama, for instance, suggested that permanent members ought 
never to chair subsidiary bodies.107 Although France, Russia and the UK retained positions as 
vice chairs, Panama has more or less got its wish: The elected members distribute the chairs 
between them.108 
 
In practice, however, the P5 still rule the roost – not least because of their influence over the 
appointment process. In 2012 working methods reformers attempted to open up the 
appointment process up to all Council members, encouraging them to consult the outgoing 
chairs and the chair of the Working Methods group.109 Moreover, although the permanent 
members no longer chair major committees like the Counter-Terrorism Committee, they exploit 
multiple pathways of influence outside the Council.110 Thirdly, the highly-involved, heavy 
workload of many of the Committees embroils non-permanent members in busywork, 
preventing them from making their mark elsewhere. Arendt’s comments about the unending toil 
of housekeeping resonate here. Reporting fatigue is only one of the ailments associated with 
administrative drudgery. Committee chairs are inundated by correspondence. In 2016, non-
permanent members attempted to relieve the burden of correspondence on the sanctions 
committees, which see an especially heavy traffic of letters.111 The fourth and final limitation of 
using chairing roles as pathways to influence is that they divide the non-permanent members. 
Occupied as individual chairs, non-permanent members are less likely to gather round a 
                                                 
105 Of the incoming 2018 intake, only Poland attended this meeting. 
106 UN Doc. S/PV.7616 (29 January 2016). The speaker’s description is not only figurative. Committee meetings are 
usually held in the conference rooms, most of which are underground in the first basement of the Conference 
Building in New York. 
107 It seems Panama’s concerns were taken to heart. None of the permanent members currently chairs a subsidiary 
body (though the UK is involved in questions relating to women, peace and security and to the protection of 
civilians) and they often serve as Vice-Chairs – UN Doc. S/2016/2/REV.4 
108 UN Doc. S/2018/2 (2 January 2018) 
109 UN Doc. S/2012/937 (17 December 2012) 
110 Isobel Roele, “Disciplinary Power in the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee” 19(1) Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law (2014) 49-84; Isobel Roele, ‘Side-lining Subsidiarity: UN Security Council ‘Legislation’ and its Infra-Law’ 79(2) 
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111 UN Doc. S/2016/658 (28 July 2016) 
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common table and work together on substantive issues. It is less likely, therefore, that they will 
deploy their collective potential against the permanent members.  
 
While it is conceivable that subcommittees could produce durable work, the deck is loaded 
against attempts to do so. It is not enough to be in office, chairs will only make something of 
their office if they have a handle on the task before them. This puts a particular premium on 
knowing-the-ropes, and not all missions possess the requisite institutional knowledge. Sievers 
and Daws note that chairing roles can be very demanding, and that missions may not be able to 
provide the human resources needed for the task.112 It is hard enough, in other words, to 
maintain business-as-usual, let alone leverage the position for greater effects. The SC recognized 
this in 2014, accepting that chairs should be appointed “as early as possible after each election of 
members of the Security Council”.113 Appointments ought now to be made before October, so 
that incoming chairs have at least 4 months’ preparation time, so a proper handover can take 
place.114 
 
In a few cases, sub-committees have acted innovatively. The 1267 Committee, for example, 
established the Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee to face down criticisms about the lack of due process in its listing practices.115 Can 
we see the Office as work in Arendt’s sense? Doing so is difficult because the office is itself an 
administrative body, very much subject to the personality of the office-holder and the zest – or 
otherwise – with which they carry out their mandate.116 This was stated in no uncertain terms by 
former Ombudsperson Kimberly Prost: “while I can state without reservation that, in practice, 
there is an Office which operates in a fiercely independent manner, that is attributable solely to 
the personalities involved”.117 Administration, as those of us who inhabit university bureaucracies 
well know, breeds more administration, and it takes a rare individual to break that cycle. 
 
The analogy with housekeeping helps us understand the political potential of sub-committee 
chairing as an activity. Although it increases non-permanent member responsibilities in a 
quantifiable way, it confines them to the basement drudgery of administration. 
 
b) Penholding 
 
An obvious way for non-permanent members to seek increased influence is in the drafting of 
Security Council outcome documents. Outcome documents are the telos of almost all Council 
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113 UN Doc. S/2014/393 (5 June 2014) 
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activity - as they are in almost any organisation.118 Achieving agreement on a text is no mean feat, 
and those proposing initiatives feel a great sense of accomplishment when agreement is 
reached.119 The practice of negotiating documents seems to come closer to “work” in Arendt’s 
sense of the word. Council documentation is both paper-pushing and world-building. Although 
the Council’s bricks and mortar world is centred on the second and third floors of the UN 
Conference Building in Manhattan, it is also an archival world – the sum of its official 
documentation. The materiality of this world is obscured by the migration of the Dag 
Hammarskjold Library online, and the partial shuttering of its physical premises.120 
 
To what extent, then, can non-permanent members contribute to this area of Council activity? 
Non-permanent members often use their presidency to push for statements on a thematic issues 
like children and armed conflict, or the rule of law. Presidential statements can be a stepping 
stone, many terms down the line, to a resolution. This long-game can only be played, however, 
by states which are in a position to serve multiple terms on the Council, and – as we have seen – 
this privilege is not equally open to all states.121 Quicker effects can be had if a non-permanent 
member can gain ownership over an issue by becoming the penholder for it. Accordingly, 
penholding is a fiercely contested matter, and one of the main sites of struggle in Note 507. 
 
The penholder has responsibility for drafting outcome documents on a specific issue, including 
resolutions, presidential statements, notes, letters and press statements. Not only is the 
penholder responsible for producing the text of drafts to be debated, it can also call meetings, 
and arrange visiting missions and briefings. In this way, the penholder can exert enormous 
control over a situation on the Council’s agenda (or an aspect thereof), or of one of its thematic 
areas. Penholding is a relatively recent phenomenon in its current form,122 which has, thus far, 
been dominated by the P3 on the grounds that the complexity of the situations on the Council’s 
agenda demands “a depth of expertise and a large staff”.123 France is penholder for most of the 
situations involving Francophone Africa; the UK holds the pen for major thematic issues of 
peacekeeping and the protection of civilians, not to mention country situations including Yemen, 
Sudan, Libya and Colombia. The US leads on counterterrorism in all its forms, and on South 
                                                 
118 Annelise Riles comments that for bureaucrats, a meeting without an output is an illegitimate meeting. “Outputs: 
the promises and perils of ethnographic engagement after the loss of faith in transnational dialogue” Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute (2017) 183-198, 187 
119 Annelise Riles also notes a slightly different affective dimension of UN documentation. “Each document, each 
survey, each position paper is the product of countless others, and for a while, at least, until the feeling fades into 
frustration, this imbues the events with a weightiness that is almost dwarfing” (“Models and Documents”, 812). 
120 Half of the Library Building – the side that constitutes the campus’ South perimeter wall - has been closed down 
for security reasons. 
121 Above, s. 2(b)   
122 Sievers and Daws, SC Procedure, Ch.5, Section 6 online update, “The “lead country” or “penholder” practice for 
drafting outcome documents” (18 August 2018). Available at: https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-5-section-6b   
123 Sievers and Daws, SC Procedure, Ch.5, Section 6 online update, “A historical overview of the “lead country” or 
“penholder” practice” (19 August 2018). Available at: https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-5-section-6c  
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Sudan, DPRK, Iran and, de facto, the Middle East.124 As Bolivia’s representative recently 
complained, “it is the permanent members who are the penholders almost exclusively”.125   
 
“Penholding” is a millennial neologism, but the exclusive and exclusionary nature of the drafting 
process has been a long-standing issue in the Council. States were ticked-off for their cliquey 
practices in a Presidential Note in 1999.126 Nevertheless, there seems to have been a step-change 
since the 2000s. As Ian Martin recently told the Council, “Member States that have returned to 
the Council after a decade or more of absence have noted the closing down of space for 
initiatives of elected members”.127 
 
Note 507 formally recognized penholding as “an informal arrangement”,128 and took steps to 
make the practice more inclusive.129  This is no small achievement. When in 2012 Portugal began 
the process of drafting a Presidential Note to address the issue, it proved such a hot potato that 
the approved text ended up expunging any mention of penholding.130 Eventually Note 507 
broached the issue, providing that any member may act as penholder, and that all members are 
encouraged to do so - including as co-penholders.131 Drafting is done according to a “silence 
procedure”, by which members are given a specific length of time to consider a draft and raise 
objections.132 This system favours states with large, experienced staffs who can react immediately 
to rapidly evolving events in complex situations. Elected members including Peru and Ethiopia 
speaking in the February 2018 open debate emphasized the importance of consultations. 
Equatorial Guinea was more forthright still, stating that consultation 
 
“frequently does not happen. The permanent members prepare the drafts, consult each 
other and finalize the process with very little time for discussion. When elected members 
wish to make comments or suggestions, the deadline has passed and there is no time to 
incorporate new suggestions, which means that non-permanent members have only two 
options — accepting a fait accompli and finding a reason to vote in favour; or abstaining 
or voting against, since sometimes they agree with the substance of the issue but not with 
the language used”.133 
 
Australia and Luxembourg’s tenacious efforts on the humanitarian issues in Syria during their 
2013-14 term provides a counter-example to the impression that permanent members control 
the drafting process. They were joined by Jordan in the next intake, who held the pen in 2015. 
Since then, a rolling cast of other states have been joint holders of the pen as the original states 
                                                 
124 Security Council Report published an invaluable list of penholders as of January 2018, available here: 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/pen-holders-and-chairs.php 
125 UN Doc. S/PV. 8175 (6 February 2018), 22 
126 UN Doc. S/1999/165 (17 February 1999) 
127 UN Doc. S/PV. 8175 (6 February 2018), 3 
128 The first formal mention is in S/2014/268 (14 April 2014) 
129 UN Doc. S/2017/507, para. 78 
130 UN Doc. S/2012/937 (17 December 2012)  
131 UN Doc. S/2017/507 (2017), para 79 
132 UN Doc. S/2017/507 (2017), para 82 
133 UN Doc. S/PV. 8175 (6 February 2018), 17 
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graduated from the Council at the end of their two year terms: Egypt, New Zealand, Spain, 
Japan, Sweden and Kuwait have all been involved. This is not merely co-penholding; it is 
successive pen-holding. Unlike chairships, which give states an administrative monopoly over a 
particular area, penholding seems to encourage cooperative ventures and collective action. States 
worked together to relieve the humanitarian crisis in Syria, their successive and imbricated efforts 
were more like a workshop than a conveyer-belt, with new states apprenticed to retiring ones. 
 
The states did not just inherit a role, they have worked on the same project. Overlapping 
handovers see to the problem of continuity, and the episode redounds with joint effort. While 
the solutions crafted by these states are far from perfect, they led to tangible changes on the 
ground, including securing Syrian government consent for humanitarian access.134 This pen-
holding activity was not mere busy-work. The non-permanent members’ 2018 commitment to 
increased interaction is a positive step in this regard.135 The position of group coordinator (which 
rotates every month), the sharing of draft documents, and the regular meetings at permanent 
representative and political coordinator levels contain a promise of collective action. 
 
This is not to say that all penholding is necessarily work because it is directed, at least nominally, 
to the passage of outcome documents. The recognition of penholding in Note 507 risks making 
penholding into an office, which would become, like chairing subsidiary committees, mainly 
administrative. In other words, it would be an office held for status and managerial convenience, 
rather than effect. This danger is less a function of non-permanent members’ capacities, than the 
current logic of distribution that governs the allocation of penholding responsibilities – empty 
slots must be filled. Sara Ahmed’s insights into performance culture help us here.136 The 
appointment itself is the performance – not the work that may be generated as a result. In this 
way the redistribution of chairs and pens in the Council can be seen as a sort of non-
performative performance of inclusivity, in Ahmed’s sense. She explains how a commitment to 
inclusion, like the one made in Note 507, can perform “the appearance of bringing something 
into effect”, which can be a way of “preserving the past”.137 The non-permanent members “get 
stuck”, to use Ahmed’s apt expression, in the basement rooms of the Conference Building. 
 
The language of penholding, moreover, seems to grease the slide from work into labour. The 
writer works; but the holder of the pen is more redolent of the order of the bath. It takes us back 
into the world of bureaucratic ceremony and protocol, masking the labour of administration with 
the pomp and circumstance of title.  
 
Penholdership is a management technique for the process of drafting outcome documents. 
Penholders galvanise commitment and organise the technicalities of putting together a draft text. 
Drafting used to be a matter of authorship – albeit fraught with technicality. As Riles put it, 
drafting negotiated documents “is a detailed, labour-intensive building-block” affair. “One slowly 
                                                 
134 UN Doc. S/Res/ 2165 (2014)  
135 Above, at (and see Sievers and Daws, SC Procedure: Online Update to Ch. 3, s. 3 (10 December 2018). Available at: 
https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-3-section-3i) 
136 Sara Ahmed, On Being Included (Duke, 2012), Chapter 3. See also Chapter 4 on the concept of non-performatives.  
137 Ahmed, On Being Included, 126 
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pieces the text together, phrase by phrase, heading by heading”.138 For all its technicality this 
process has not lost its character as work. The French translation of “original mover”, the phrase 
used in the Council’s Rules of Procedure, is not quite apt, to be sure.139 Riles’ work on drafting 
documents in the UN troubles the way international lawyers often treat such documents as 
though there was a single consciousness which meant something by the text. The current French 
term for penholders, by contrast, is redacteurs.140 The function comes closer to the artisanal sense 
of work, enabling us to distinguish it from art work. Indeed, the idea that several people come 
together around a single table to produce a durable object resonates with the original styling of 
the UN as a “workshop for peace”.141 
 
4. Transformation and Renewal 
 
As a strategy to transform the Security Council, working methods reform is logical but flawed. 
Although it increases the nominal status of non-permanent members by giving them 
administrative roles, it thereby ensnares them in the non-performative busy-work of 
administration. Instead of renewing the Council through their durable contributions, non-
permanent members end up as interchangeable cogs in the Council’s administrative machinery.   
 
This is particularly clear in the characteristically managerial inclusion of new member training as 
part of Note 507.142 The approach to socializing new members - “transitional arrangements”143 – 
is very much about socializing newcomers into an existing culture, rather from letting new 
members bring a refreshing diversity to the body. The transition, in other words, is a one-way 
street. Non-permanent members are not expected to add their own rhythm to Council affairs, 
but to get themselves “up to speed” with the Council’s furious tempo.144 The non-permanent 
members who have fared best have tended to be from the Global North – like Australia, as 
already mentioned, or Germany, which succeeded in bifurcating the work of the al Qaeda and 
Taliban Sanctions Committee during its 2012-12 term.145  
 
The impression that the work culture is one of fast-paced administration is reinforced by one of 
the major training events for new members, the Hitting-the-Ground-Running workshop organised 
by Finland, in collaboration with Columbia University and the Security Council Affairs Division, 
every November. Sessions are called things like “taking stock and looking ahead”,146 and 
                                                 
138 Annelise Riles, “Models and Documents: Artefacts of International Legal Knowledge” 48(4) ICLQ (1999) 805-
825; Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out (University of Michigan Press, 2000) 
139 The term is used in Rules 32 and 35 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure 
140 The distinction is made by Sievers and Daws, SC Procedure: Online Update Available at: 
https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-5-section-6b   
141 In the words of its chief architect, Wallace K. Harrison. See George A. Dudley, A Workshop for Peace (MIT Press, 
1994) 
142 UN Doc. S/2017/507, paras. 140-142 
143 UN Doc. S/2016/619 (15 July 2016) 
144 Above, at 
145 As discussed in John Langmore and Ramesh Thakur, “The Elected but Neglected Security Council Members” 
39(2) The Washington Quarterly (2016) 99-114, 108 
146 UN Doc. S/2017/468 (1 June 2017) 
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members trade “lessons learned” and “best practices”.147 Such training is the equivalent of 
limbering up for a big race. Participation is strictly competitive, and the permanent members are 
the ones to beat. The platforms on which incoming members were elected by their regional 
groupings are a sideshow. The main event is simply keeping up.  Under these circumstances, 
only the most seasoned and best prepared of incoming members could hope to make something 
of their office, and even then they are seriously hindered by the existing agendas of the P5.148 
 
The obduracy of the P5 has driven some states to act outside the Council by joining together in 
Groups of Friends created to deal with a particular situation on the Council’s agenda or, 
thematic issues like Women, Peace, and Security. As Jochen Prantl, who has written extensively 
on the phenomenon, explains, such groups are informal arrangements which operate outside the 
Council.149 Although this constitutes a pathway to enduring influence for a particular member 
state, it does not have a transformative effect on the Council itself. 
 
Groups of Friends, as Prantl illustrates with his example of the Western Contact Group on 
Namibia (Canada, France, Germany, UK, and USA), are often brought together “to escape those 
structural deficiencies [of the Council] and to work outside the UN framework”.150 The tactic has 
been used by several non-permanent member states to make progress on particular issues. For 
instance, Australia’s involvement in the work of the Core Group on East Timor, and Canada’s 
involvement in the Core Group of Friends of Haiti.151 Groups of Friends have also been used by 
the permanent members. Russia’s involvement in the Group of Friends for Georgia, the so-
called “P5+1” group of states which negotiated with Iran over its nuclear programme, or the 
Group of Friends of Libya, which included France, the UK and the USA, among many others.152 
Often the act of stepping out of the Council yields complementary action, but sometimes, as in 
the extreme examples of Operation Allied Force or Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is a way of by-
passing the Security Council.153 In any case, the tactic of stepping outside the Council was already 
being questioned in the early 1990s, when Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned that 
although such groups can make valuable contributions, they lead to confused lines of 
responsibility and effort.154 
                                                 
147 The first session of the Hitting the Ground Running workshop in 2017, for example, asked “Which benchmarks 
should be employed to gauge the extent to which the Council has or has not been successful over the past year?” (p. 
6) and “Are there implementation steps that should be regarded as priorities for the coming year?” (p. 8), UN Doc. 
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2013–2014” 22 Global Governance (2016), 59–77 
149 Jochen Prantl, The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States (OUP, 2006) 
150 Jochen Prantl, “Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council” 59(3) International Organization (2005) 
559-592, 575 
151 See generally, Theresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict 
(United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), Chapter 7 
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Although by no means all the states involved in Groups of Friends are from the global North –
the Core Group for Haiti includes Latin American states like Brazil, and the Group of Friends 
for Libya includes a number states in the Middle East – it has been suggested that the tactic of 
leaving the Council to gain influence is limited to the richest, biggest, and best connected states. 
This certainly seems to be borne out by the use of the tactic by the P5. As Theresa Whitfield 
explained, Groups of Friends are used by already dominant states to assert “elite ownership of 
specific issues”.155 We might question, indeed, how renewing the rolling involvement of all these 
states from the Global North really is, especially when the success of Groups of Friends is often 
down to “the deep pockets of the international donor community”.156  
 
Contrasting working methods reform with Groups of Friends as a pathways to influence brings 
out the potential in the former. Where working methods reform could transform the Council, 
these groups seek influence by by-passing the Council; where working methods reform can be 
inclusive and can promote diversity, groups tend to be dominated by states from the Global 
North or by emerging powers like Brazil. They specifically take politics outside the Council, and 
while they involve a gathering of states, they do not come together around the same chairs and 
the same table, as Arendt put it.157 Working methods reform surely promises a more progressive 
tactic for change if only because it promises to change how the Council works, not just what the 
Council achieves. 
 
In this respect, Groups of Friends can be contrasted with interventions that take place outside 
the Council’s formal administrative structures, but with a view to changing the Council’s working 
practices. Non-permanent members’ increasing willingness to come together as a group and 
harness their collective influence is a promising development. Sievers and Daws report that in 
September 2018, incumbent and incoming members gathered to agree Ten Elements for 
Enhanced E10 Coordination and Joint Action,158 which was agreed outside the institutional 
framework. In doing so, the non-permanent members stepped outside formulaic pathways to 
influence, but came together in order to harness the potential of their collective power. 
 
What prospect is there of a more diverse Council? How can the renewing possibilities of the 
non-permanence of two-thirds of its membership be harnessed? At the beginning of this article, 
I acknowledged that renewal was not sufficient for political action in Arendt’s sense. A positive 
diversity of decision-making may be too much to hope for. Instead, I suggested that a negative 
politics of difference might be possible. What would this look like? 
 
Non-identity thinking is at the heart of negative dialectics, Adorno’s answer to the possibility of 
post-Enlightenment politics. Non-identity thinking is the polar opposite of the working methods 
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reformers desire to ensure “continuity in the work of the Council”.159 It makes the renewing 
effect of the non-permanent members into a not-like-that, rather than a like-this. Non-
permanent members, then, can go against the Council grain in order to leave their mark. 
Recognizing the superfluity of administrative responsibilities,160 may enable them – in Susan 
Marks’ lovely phrase – to cultivate an “in-the-wayness”;161 not sabotage, but not business-as-
usual either. Instead of falling into step, non-permanent members should cultivate a syncopated 
approach to the terms they serve. In doing so, the members remain within the framework of the 
Council, but as a disruptive presence. In this negative sense, they insist on the diversity of being 
together in the Council. States come together around the same horseshoe table, but they meet in 
all their difference.  
 
Seen in this light, Kazakhstan’s flag installation ceremony takes on a new significance. Rather 
than performing the non-performativity of administration, we can see it as a performance of in-
the-wayness. Slap-bang in the middle of the second floor corridor of the Conference Building, 
the ceremony hijacked the press stakeout area – a space of high politics and global attention. The 
ceremony was in the way. We can read it as a statement of presence that materialised diversity. In 
taking over the physical space of the Council, the incoming members of the Council came 
together and asserted themselves, rather than politely tip-toing around the permanent members, 
or rushing to keep up-to-speed with them. If we see these states as asserting their unlikeness, 
rather than their likeness, the ceremony becomes a performance not of the elevated status of the 
new members, but of renewing the Security Council – of difference in the corridors of power. 
                                                 
159 UN Doc. S/2016/619 (Note by the President of the Security Council, 15 July 2016 
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